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of-use#LAAWe live in a society increasingly preoccupied with healthy food. Restaurant
menus now include heart smart options, network news programs run segments on
teenage vegetarians, consumer groups denounce our beloved movie popcorn, and
people dead set against the metric system count fat grams in their light beers.
At the same time, of course, the percentage of obese people in our country has
reached bulging proportions. In the face of all this, enterprising manufacturers
see a way to improve the general welfare{and make a decent prot{by providing
healthier foods. Educating the consumer about the benets of a better diet is
necessary to open up new market niches. Health sells, and manufacturers have
been understandably eager to seize the day.
The Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration reg-
ulate the types of messages that food manufacturers can send in their eorts to
capture the healthy food market. This paper will explore the relationship be-
tween the regulatory approaches at the FTC and FDA. The rst section delves
into the history of and statutory authority for each agency's approach. The sec-
ond section compares the current ocial regulatory stance toward health claims
at the FTC and FDA, and analyzes the recent rumblings for harmonization.
The third section explores public statements by FTC ocials that may reveal
more practical policy. The fourth section analyzes whether recent enforcement
actions reect the drive toward harmonization. Finally, the fth section exam-
ines the reasons for vestigial inconsistencies at the agencies, and argues for a
1exible approach.
I. Background
A. History, Statutory Authority, and Culture
The FTC derives authority to regulate product claims from x 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. Specically, x 5 prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or aecting commerce.1 xx 14 and 15 of the FTC Act prohibit food
advertisements, other than labeling, that are misleading in a material respect.2
FDA, on the other hand, derives its regulatory authority from the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act. This statute broadly prohibits the misbranding of any food
in interstate commerce3, then declares food to be misbranded if its labeling is
false or misleading in any particular4. A food is also deemed to be misbranded
if its label contains health-related information that fails to adhere to detailed
agency regulations designed to contextualize it.5
The statutory language in the FTC Act seems to provide the Com-
mission with a broad mandate, and in fact the early cases establish that both
agencies could regulate food labeling claims under their respective statutes.6
In addition, food manufacturers making identical false claims on food labeling
and in other advertising media are subject to concurrent attack by the FTC
115 U.S.C. x 45 (1988).
2Id.
321 U.S.C.A. x 331 (1996).
421 U.S.C.A. x 343(a) (1996).
521 U.S.C.A. x 343(r) (1996).
6Fresh Grown Preserve Co. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942).
2and FDA. The FTC could issue a cease and desist order while FDA pursued a
seizure action.7
In 1954, the FTC and FDA entered into a Memorandum of Under-
standing regarding the regulation of food manufacturer claims. The FTC agreed
to focus on food advertising, while FDA assumed responsibility for food labels.8
At times, this system of bifurcated oversight has led to signicantly dierent
standards for food product health claims on labels versus other advertising me-
dia. For example, the FTC has generally allowed manufacturers to promulgate
reasonably substantiated health claims for their food products.9 FDA, on the
other hand, has opted for a more rigid regulatory regime, one which requires a
great deal of evidence before a health claim can be made.
To some extent, regulatory cultures at the FTC and FDA contribute
to the divergence in food health claims standards. Diering statutory mandates
in turn inuence the cultures. The FTC is charged with preventing only decep-
tive or unfair advertising practices.10 The statutory language is prophylactic
and reactive, and seems to contemplate egregious manufacturer representations.
Accordingly, the Commission has traditionally eschewed the pre-clearance style
of regulation in favor of post hoc enforcement. In the deregulatory heyday of the
1980s, the FTC began to encourage truthful and non-misleading health claims
for food products.11
7United States v. Various Quantities... Instant Alberty Food, 83 F.Supp 882 (D.C. 1973).
8Working Agreement Between FTC and Food and Drug Administration, 4 Trade Reg.
Rep. (CCH) 9850.01 (1971).
9See, e.g., Peter Hutt, Government Regulation of Health Claims in Food Labeling, 41 Food
Drug Cosm. L.J. 3 (1986) (hereinafter referred to as Hutt).
1015 U.S.C. x 45 (1914).
11See Hutt.
3FDA, on the other hand, declares itself responsible for ensuring that
foods are safe, wholesome, and sanitary... and regulated products are honestly,
accurately and informatively represented.12 Recent legislation has also charged
FDA with educating the public about health issues13, and indeed FDA itself
has declared its intention to assist the media, consumer groups, and health pro-
fessionals in providing accurate, current information about regulated products
to the public.14 FDA's rigorous health claims standards reect its vigilance in
protecting the integrity of the food label. FDA surveys indicate that the level
of consumer condence in the honesty/integrity/truthfulness of the food label
is very high15, and accordingly the agency takes pains to maintain its reliability.
B. Judicial Interpretations
Interestingly, the courts have used a wide variety of standards to deter-
mine whether a label or an advertisement is deceptive under the FTC Act or
misleading under the FD&C Act. In actions brought under the FD&C Act,
several judges have concluded that the purpose of the legislation is to protect
the ignorant, unthinking, and the credulous.16 Any other construction, it was
said, would open a loophole through which those who prey upon the weakness,
gullibility, and superstition of human nature can escape the consequences of
their actions.17 Others, however, have interpreted the FD&C Act to contem-
12FDA mission statement at www.fda.gov.
13Nutrition Labeling Education Act, 21 U.S.C.A. 343(r).
14FDA mission statement at www.fda.gov.
1555 Fed. Reg. 5176, 5286 (February 13, 1990)
16U.S. v. 62 Packages... Marmola Prescription Tablets, 48 F.Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis. 1943);
U.S. v. Article Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottle... Sudden Change, 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir.
1969)
17U.S. v. Sudden Change at 741.
4plate a reasonable person standard for consumer confusion.18 Some
courts interpreting the FTC Act have also adopted the ignorant, unthinking,
and credulous consumer standard19 in determining whether an advertisement is
deceptive or not. In fact, the 2nd Circuit declared that the remedial purpose of
the Federal Trade Commission Act is suciently analogous to that of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act to justify the identical ignorant consumer standard.20
Many courts, however, rely on something approaching the reasonableness stan-
dard. For example, one court acknowledged the traditional ignorant, unthinking
and credulous standard, but warned that neither the courts nor the Commission
should freely speculate that the... public will place a patently absurd interpre-
tation on an advertisement.21 Another court analyzed an advertisers' claims
under a commonsense net impression standard.22 Still another court have re-
quired that the advertisement mislead an appreciable segment of the public to
be deceptive under the FTC Act.23 Regardless of the consumer standard, it is
settle doctrine that an advertisement susceptible of more than one interpretation
is deceptive if any of the interpretations are false.24
II. Current Agency Enforcement Regimes
18U.S. v. Pinaud, Inc., 1938-1949 FDLI Jud. & Admin. Rec. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); U.S. v.
Vrilium Products, Co., 1949-1950 FDLI Jud. & Admin. Rec. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
19Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942); Charles of the Ritz Dist. Corp. v. FTC,
143 F.2d 676 (2d. Cir. 1944); Heinz v. Kirchner, 63 F.T.C. 1282, 1290 (1963), a'd, 337 F.2d
751 (9th Cir. 1964).
20U.S. v. Sudden Change at 741.
21Standard Oil of California v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1978).
22Removatron International Co. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir. 1989).
23Enurtone Co. v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1960).
24Country Tweeds, Inc. v. FTC, 326 F2d 144 (2d. Cir. 1963); Continental Wax Co. v.
FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L.
Rev. 658 (1992) (hereinafter Craswell).
5While the courts have evinced some confusion about the extent of the
protective mandate, the agencies have promulgated regulations and issued state-
ments of policy that better reect their own internal enforcement philosophies.
Because the FTC and FDA wield so much discretionary power, and because so
few cases are actually litigated under the applicable statutes, these declarations
are far better indicators of the regime under which food manufacturers must
operate.
A. The FDA Standard { Rigid but Detailed
In 1990 Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling Education Act, which added
x 343(r) to the FDCA.25 In addition to directing FDA to standardize and limit
terms on food labels, this amendment also broadened requirements to disclose
nutrition information. Congress intended that the new regulations educate con-
sumers about healthy dietary practices.26 x 343(r) tightens the regulatory screws
in two major areas of food labeling: nutrient content claims and broader health
claims.
1. Nutrient Content Claims
x 343(r)(1)(A) of the NLEA forbids nutrient content claims that depart from
the strict guidelines eshed out in detailed FDA regulations.27 Examples of nu-
2521 U.S.C.A. x 301 et seq. (1988).
26House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of
1990, H.R. Doc. No. 538, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1990).
2721 U.S.C.A. x 343(r)(1) (1996).
6trient content claims include phrases like low sodium, contains 100 calories, high
in oat bran, or healthy, contains 3 grams of fat.28 Any nutrient content claim
on a food label must be accompanied by a prominent referral statement, which
directs the consumer to See [panel] for nutrition information.29 Furthermore,
FDA authorizes only a limited set of words (and reasonable spelling variations)
for use in nutrient content claims.30 Presumably, these measures minimize con-
sumer confusion and further FDA's educational goals.
FDA prescribes a detailed series of metrics to validate absolute and compar-
ative nutrient content claims. For example, claiming that a food is a good source
of a particular nutrient is an absolute claim that requires that each serving of
the food contain 10-19% of the RDI of that nutrient. Likewise, declaring that a
food has more of a particular vitamin is a comparative claim that requires that
each serving contain at least 10% more of the RDI for that vitamin than the
reference food.31 A manufacturer making a comparative claim must specically
identify the reference food (e.g., Brand X) and include both absolute and per-
centage comparisons.
Manufacturers may draw from a short list of narrowly dened words
in making their claims. These include more, less, reduced, added, extra, light,
high, low, and a few others. In a meager eort to placate hamstrung marketers,
FDA also allows manufacturers to use a few synonyms. For instance, manufac-
2821 C.F.R. 101.13(b).
2921 C.F.R. 101.13(g).
3021 C.F.R. 101.13(b)(4).
3121 C.F.R. 101.54.
7turers may substitute rich in or excellent source of for high.32
FDA also places restrictions on implied nutrient content claims. These
are dened as representations that (1) describe the food in manner that sug-
gests the presence or absence of a particular nutrient (e.g., contains oat bran)
or (2) suggest in connection with an explicit nutrient claim that the food may
be useful in maintaining a healthy diet (e.g., healthy, contains 3 grams of fat).33
Implied claims must not only comply with the general requirements for nutrient
content claims, they must also satisfy the performance metrics laid out in the
regulations. For instance, labeling claims that indicate a food contains oat bran
are only allowed when that food qualies as a good source34 of dietary ber.
Similarly, marketers seeking to use any variation on the word healthy in the
food label must ensure that the food meet FDA's standards for fats, saturated
fats, sodium, cholesterol, and various vitamins and minerals. FDA's regulatory
oversight in this area is astoundingly precise.
FDA's regulations also require manufacturers to disclose certain infor-
mation if the food contains prescribed levels of risk-increasing nutrients. Foods
containing specied levels of fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, and sodium must
modify the mandatory nutrition panel referral statement to signal the danger-
ous nutrient level. For example, a food containing more than 13 grams of fat
per serving must direct the consumer to See side panel for information about
total fat and other nutrients.35
32Ibid.
3321 C.F.R. 101.13(b)(2).
34See supra, footnote 31.
3521 C.F.R. 101.13(h).
82. Health Claims
x 343(r)(1)(B) severely limits broad claims linking food nutrients to disease
or other health-related conditions. If a food contains certain prescribed levels of
a risk-enhancing nutrient (e.g., 4 grams of saturated fat), then its label will be
disqualied from making any health claim whatsoever.36 In addition, the food
must contain at least 10% of the Reference Daily Intake or Daily Reference
Value for a number of vitamins and minerals in order to promote any health
claim on its label.37 This is the so-called jelly bean rule, which no doubt intends
to prevent manufacturers from loading their non-nutritive goodies with enough
calcium, for instance, to declare them a bone-saving miracle.
In perhaps the most important provision of the NLEA, Congress indicated
that FDA should only allow health claims about which there is signicant sci-
entic agreement based on the totality of publicly available evidence.38 The
standard is broad{some would say vague{but FDA explicitly refused to formu-
late parameters of scientic certainty in its regulations. The agency did cite
a number of important factors in its analysis. It agreed to consider well de-
signed clinical studies, animal studies, and epidemiological data, for instance,
but, quite naturally, it declared a preference for human studies.39 While FDA
stopped short of requiring consensus or unanimity in the scientic community, it
3621 C.F.R. 101.14(a)(5).
3721 C.F.R. 101.14(e)(6).
3821 U.S.C.A. x 343(r)(3)(B).
3958 FR 2478 at 2506.
9nevertheless cited NLEA legislative history indicating that the Secretary should
have a high level of comfort that the claim is valid before approving it.40 FDA
also hinted that while proprietary research would not be ignored, ndings in
peer reviewed research journals may carry extra weight.41 Inevitably, FDA
must take a case-by-case approach.
To date, FDA has approved ten health claims. These range from state-
ments linking calcium-rich diets with the prevention of osteoporosis42; diets low
in cholesterol, saturated fats, and total fats with the reduction of the risk of
heart disease43; and, most recently, diets high in soluble ber from whole oats
with the reduction of heart disease.44 In a recent full-page print advertisement,
Quaker Oats characterized this last claim as the rst authorization of a food
specic health message.45 Pursuant to the educational mandate outlined in the
statute itself, FDA's regulations require that health claims indicate the value
of the ingested substance as part of a total dietary pattern. In addition, the
regulations suggest that if other non-dietary factors aect the disease or health-
related condition, they may need to be addressed in the health claim.46 The
FDA regulation authorizing each specic claim oers model language to fulll
these requirements. For example, claims about calcium and osteoporosis must
explain how gender, age, ethnicity, and exercise aect the relationship between
4056 FR 60,537 at 60,547.
41Ibid.
4221 C.F.R. 101.72.
4321 C.F.R. 101.75.
44Health Claims on Oatmeal May Be Made, New York Times, January 22, 1997, A10.
45Now he has another reason to smile! (advertisement), The New York Times (January 23,
1997), A15.
4621 C.F.R. 101.14(d)(2)(iii).
10calcium consumption and osteoporosis.47 Model language can be paraphrased,
as long as mandatory elements are addressed.48
The limited number of available health claims indicates that FDA is
proceeding cautiously in this area. The agency must not only distinguish be-
tween substantiated health benets and puery, it must also distill sophisticated
scientic relationships into information the public can comprehend. Undoubt-
edly, FDA's concerns about information overload and the integrity of the food
label underlie its conservative approach in this area.
B. The FTC Standard { Harmonization Lite
While the FTC has traditionally encouraged substantiated health represen-
tations to educate consumers49, in recent years the Commission has been pres-
sured to harmonize its policy with that of FDA. The Center for Science in the
Public Interest (CSPI), for instance, has repeatedly blasted the FTC for its
unwillingness to implement harmonization.50 In addition, some legislators have
attempted to mandate a uniform standard{the more stringent FDA version{
with regard to health claims across advertising and labels.51 The concerned
parties evidently regard the barrage of health claims advertising spawned by
4721 C.F.R. 101.72.
4858 FR 2510.
49Elisabeth Sachs, Health Claims in the Marketplace: The Future of the FDA and the
FTC's Regulatory Split, 48 Food & Drug L.J. 263 (1993) (hereinafter Health Claims in the
Marketplace).
50See, e.g., John Donnelly, Consumer Group Blasts Health Claims in TV Milk Ads, Food &
Drink Daily (March 6, 1995); CSPI Hits FTC's Proposed Consent Order with Haagen-Dazs,
Vol. 3, No. 21 Food Labeling News (February 23, 1995).
51Health Claims in the Marketplace at 263-64.
11FTC's mid-1980's policy as coercive and harmful to consumer health. They
may also feel that diering standards across advertising media confuse con-
sumers and potentially undermine the cherished integrity of the food label.
In response to these attacks, in 1994 the FTC issued a 28 page En-
forcement Policy Statement on Food Advertising (hereinafter EPS).52 Ostensi-
bly intended to create a consistent regulatory framework across the agencies, the
EPS nevertheless stops short of adopting all of FDA's stricter standards. The
document is a fascinating series of earnest deferrals and pointed reservations.
Even the ringing words of cooperation in the introduction eventually subvert
themselves: The Commission recognizes the importance of consistent treatment
of nutrient content and health claims in food advertising and labeling and seeks
to harmonize its advertising enforcement program with FDA's food labeling reg-
ulations to the fullest extent possible under the statutory authority of the FTC
Act.53 (emphasis added). From the outset the EPS carefully connes the scope
of its action.
Despite the dissembling, however, it is clear that the EPS intends to
increase the level of harmonization between FDA and the FTC. FDA has char-
acterized the document as establishing that food advertising will now be held
to the same standards as food labeling.54 This seems a bit overstated, though,
because in many areas the EPS indicates that the FTC will depart from FDA's
nutrient and health claim standards. The EPS does seem to acknowledge FDA's
regulations as the baseline, however, by declaring that it is unlikely that the
521994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,388.
53Ibid.
54FDA Consumer, Sept. 1994.
12Commission will take action under Section 5 and 12 of the FTC Act... if [the
health claims] comply with FDA's regulations.55 Perhaps this will encourage
advertisers to rein in some of the more aggressive campaigns.
One indication that the EPS fails to harmonize agency policies is its
explicit reliance on traditional interpretations of FTC statutory authority. In a
section of the statement entitled Legal Framework for Commission Action, the
Commission refers to its 1984 Deception Policy Statement (Deception State-
ment) and 1987 Statement on Advertising Substantiation (Substantiation State-
ment) as dening the principles for interpreting deceptive acts or practices under
the FTC Act.56 These documents were promulgated at the height of the dereg-
ulatory heyday at the FTC, during which the Commission visibly broke with
FDA over the costs and benets of a looser standard of substantiation for food
product health claims.57
The Deception Statement indicates that an advertisement will be un-
lawful if it contains a representation or omission of fact that is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and that representation
or omission is material.58 While claims involving health or safety are presump-
tively material59, the Deception Statement clearly rejects the ignorant, unthink-
ing, and credulous standard adopted by so many courts in early interpretations
of both the FTC and FD&C Act. Rather than focusing on specic claims or
551994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388.
56Ibid.
57Evidence of the FTC's regulatory stance can be found in the Comments of the Bureaus of
Competition, Consumer Protection, and Economics of the FTC in Response to a Request for
Public Comment on its Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Regarding Food Labeling,
Dkt. 85N-0061, 55 Fed. Reg. 5176 (Feb. 1990).
581994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388.
59Ibid.
13taboo phrases, the FTC instead pursues a case-by-case approach that looks to
whether the overall impression created by the ad is deceptive.60
The Substantiation Statement requires that advertisers have a reason-
able basis for making their health claims.61 The EPS declares that [a] reasonable
basis consists of competent and reliable evidence.62 Interestingly, the EPS cites
a series 1992 cases as dening the nature of competent and reliable. In this
respect the FTC's new standard is in fact backward-looking and deferential to
earlier FTC policies. The FTC further states:
Commission orders generally require that scientic evidence consist
of tests, analyses, research, studies or other evidence conducted and evaluated
in an objective manner by persons qualied to do so, using procedures generally
accepted in the relevant profession to yield accurate and reliable results. The
substantiation must also be examined in the context of the entire body of rele-
vant evidence, particularly if it produces results that are contrary to that body
of evidence.63
While this standard implies a good deal of rigor, in the past it has been
interpreted as somewhat less stringent than FDA's signicant scientic agree-
ment standard. In any case, because the FTC and FDA lay out substantiation
requirements in dierent language, clever lawyers have an opportunity to carve
out distinctions in regulatory policy, whether or not those distinctions were in-
tended.
1. Nutrient Content Claims
In spite of the EPS's deference to hoary FTC doctrine, in several specic
60Ibid.
61Ibid.
62Ibid.
63Ibid.
14circumstances the FTC explicitly adopts FDA's regulatory approach. For in-
stance, the EPS states that the Commission will apply FDA's denitions for
absolute nutrient content terms when those terms are used in the same context
in advertising.64 Concerned about consumer expectation that nutrient content
terms are consistently applied, the Commission also indicated that it would con-
tinue to defer to FDA's scientic and public health determinations.65 Given the
historical discord regarding the regulation of semi-substantiated health claims,
it is unclear just how much cooperation continued deference will engender.
In the arena of comparative nutrient content claims, the EPS cites FDA's
guidelines as safe harbors from Commission action. This apparently reects
standard FTC policy since the passing of NLEA.66 However, the Commission
also states that a comparative advertising claim that is accurately qualied to
identify the nature of a nutrient dierence and to eliminate misleading impli-
cations may comply with Section 5, even if the nutrient dierence does not
meet FDA's prescribed dierences for purposes of labeling.67 (emphasis added)
While declaring its intention to carefully scrutinize those claims that depart
from FDA's guidelines, the EPS clearly authorizes appropriately qualied health
claims. Rather than adopting FDA's bright line rules, the FTC stands fast with
its traditionally broader test of whether the overall impression of the advertise-
64Ibid.
65Ibid.
66See, e.g., Nestle Food Co., FTC Dkt. No. C-2265 (Jan. 21, 1992) (consent order)
(permitting representations authorized by FDA's food labeling regulations).
671994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388.
15ment is deceptive.68
The EPS oers a specic example of how its exible standard provides
food manufacturers the opportunity to dierentiate their products:
[A]n advertiser may seek to signal to consumers that, while it has
reduced total fat and saturated fat in its product by 25%, it has also achieved
a small reduction in sodium compared with other products in that category. In
these circumstances, a truthful claim that makes clear that the sodium reduction
is less than the 25% reduction in other nutrients and does not overstate the
signicance of this incidental reduction is unlikely to mislead consumers.
While it is arguable whether consumers can adequately negotiate the maze
of claims and disclaimers involved in this scenario, it seems plausible that con-
sumers would benet from information about nutrient disparities deemed in-
signicant under FDA's regulations. Over the course of a day's worth of serv-
ings, even small variations in nutrient intake can have a large cumulative impact.
While FDA authorizes only certain synonyms for nutrient content
terms, the FTC's Enforcement Policy Statement rejects this approach. How-
ever, the Commission does caution that when express or implied claims suggest
that a food product meets the standard for use of an FDA-dened term, adver-
tisers should ensure that the food actually meets the relevant FDA standard.69
For example,
[U]se of the phrases 'packed with' or 'lots of' to describe the level of ber
in a food could convey to some reasonable consumers that the food is 'high' in
ber. Because FDA's regulations dene the terms 'good source' and 'high' with
respect to ber, consumer are likely to be misled if a 'high ber' claim is implied
by an ad for a food that is only a 'good source' of ber.70
Thus, while advertisers are free to experiment with synonyms under the
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
70Ibid.
16FTC system, they risk regulatory action if their word smiths play fast and loose
with FDA's language. As Commission precedent establishes, advertisements
susceptible of both misleading and truthful interpretations by the reasonable
consumer will be deemed misleading.71
Both FDA and the FTC employ a case-by-case approach to evaluating
implied nutrient content claims. The Commission vows to analyze the overall
context of the advertisement rather than prescribe or prohibit specic represen-
tations. For instance, in one case the FTC found that claims about the amount
of milk in processed cheese slices were implied claims about calcium content.72
The FTC standard is vague only because the potential range of implied claims
is vast. The FTC's broad discretion may paralyze the would-be advertiser or
encourage clever health claim innuendo. Stating its commitment to harmoniza-
tion, the FTC vows to give great weight to any FDA determinations concerning
ingredient statements in analyzing the net impression conveyed by an ad.73 In
the end, though, it is likely that traditional regulatory philosophies will dictate
practical policy in an area as hazy as this one.
In the area of nutrient content claim disclosures, the FTC explicitly
breaks with FDA's approach. Stating that the educational goals of the NLEA...
are beyond the scope of the Commission's law enforcement mandate, the EPS
announces that the failure to provide nutrition information that consumers may
nd useful in improving their diet... is not necessarily subject to challenge un-
71See supra, footnote 20.
721994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388.
73Ibid.
17der Section 5.74 However, where an advertisement conveys the net impression
that a food makes only positive contributions to a diet, the failure to disclose
the presence of risk-increasing nutrients may be actionable.75 In addition, the
Commission also pledges to scrutinize advertising claims about cholesterol, sat-
urated fat, and ber to eliminate inappropriate inferences regarding the overall
healthiness of the product.76 This parallels FDA's special mandate to police
labeling claims in these areas.77
2. Health Claims
Perhaps the most interesting section of the EPS concerns the FTC's ap-
proach to health claims. In an eort to downplay years of disharmony among
the agencies, the FTC rst declares that the principles underlying FDA's signif-
icant scientic agreement standard for food health claims form the foundation
of the Commission's well-established deception and advertising substantiation
doctrines.78 Later, the EPS again attempts to paper over historical regulatory
discrepancies by insisting that [l]ike FDA, the Commission imposes a rigorous
substantiation standard for... health claims for food products.79
In the past, the FTC's competent and reliable evidence standard had been
dened as tests, analyses, research, studies or other evidence based on the exper-
74Ibid.
75Ibid.
76Ibid.
7721 U.S.C.A. x 343(r)(2)(A)(iii)-(v).
781994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388.
79Ibid.
18tise of professionals in the relevant area, that have been conducted and evaluated
in an objective manner by persons qualied to do so, using procedures generally
accepted in the profession to yield accurate and reliable results.80 In the ab-
stract, it is dicult to compare this mountain of words to signicant scientic
agreement. In the real world, however, the FTC generally required a lower level
of scientic consensus.81
With the promulgation of the EPS, however, the FTC appears to have
taken a step closer to adopting FDA's health claims approach. For instance,
the Statement declares that the 'signicant scientic agreement' standard, as
set forth in the NLEA and FDA's regulations, [is] the principal guide to what
experts in the eld of diet-disease relationships would consider reasonable sub-
stantiation for an unqualied health claim.82 Accordingly, the Commission
admits that it is likely that it will reach the same conclusions as FDA regarding
the adequacy of scientic evidence for unqualied health claims.
In keeping with its tradition of looser guidelines, however, the FTC rec-
ognizes that there may be certain limited instances in which carefully qualied
health claims may be permitted under Section 5 although not yet authorized by
FDA, if the claims are expressly qualied to convey clearly and fully the extent
of the scientic support.83 While preserving this loophole, the FTC cautions
that [f]ood marketers should not expect to circumvent FDA's petition process
for health claims simply by limiting the assertion of unapproved or unreviewed
80Ibid.
81See supra, footnote 10.
821994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388.
83Ibid.
19claims to advertising.84 Recognizing the potential confusion that qualications
and disclaimers inevitably engender, the Commission also pledged to be espe-
cially vigilant in ensuring that qualied claims are presented in a manner that
ensures that consumers understand both the extent of the support for the claim
and the existence of any signicant contrary view within the scientic commu-
nity.85
The EPS recognizes the merits of prohibiting health claims for foods
that contain risk-increasing levels of total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol, and
sodium. Accordingly, it states that the Commission will rely heavily on FDA's
determination of the operative danger levels. As usual, however, the Commis-
sion also indicates that it will not necessarily prohibit all health claims for foods
that contain such levels.86 By way of illustration,
the Commission would not prohibit a truthful advertising claim that explains
in a nondeceptive manner the health advantages of substituting meat or poultry
items that are relatively low in fat or saturated fat for higher fat alternatives
(e.g., a claim suggesting the merit of substituting skinless breast of turkey for
hamburger). Such claims would assist consumers who are trying to improve
their diets but who are unwilling to forgo all meat and poultry.87
These claims would not be available under FDA's food labeling scheme,
because turkey breasts themselves contain risk-increasing levels of fats. Once
again, the FTC's tradition of cost-benet analysis carries over into its harmo-
nization eort.
Interestingly, even before the harmonization eort undertaken in the
EPS, the FTC had attacked some unqualied health claims for foods that con-
84Ibid., footnote 79.
85Ibid.
86Ibid.
87Id. at footnote 85.
20tained risk-increasing nutrient levels. In the Campbell's Soup case, for instance,
the Commission required the manufacturer to disclose the high sodium content
of its soups in advertisements making claims about heart disease and choles-
terol.88 While this may have been an egregious case that triggered the FTC's
higher standard of deception, the Commission acknowledges in the EPS that
FDA's treatment of health claims in labeling for any food containing a risk-
increasing level of a nutrient... could well increase consumers' expectations...
that the foods do not present any signicant health risks.89 This seems to imply
that the FTC and FDA health claims policies may eventually converge.
The EPS pays obeisance to FDA guidelines regarding threshold lev-
els of nutrients to qualify for certain health claims (e.g., high enough calcium
levels to speak of the benecent eects on osteoporosis) and minimum nutri-
tional value to qualify for any health claim whatsoever (the so called jelly bean
rule).90 However, just as in the case of comparative nutrient content claims,
the FTC recognizes the value of certain limited instances in which it is possible
to craft a qualied, truthful, and nonmisleading claim comparing the relative
health benets of a food product to other products for which the food can be
substituted.91 It appears the FTC will take a highly contextualized approach
in evaluating borderline advertisements.
Finally, the FTC cites its limited mandate in declining to adopt FDA
model language and disclosure requirements for health claims. As per usual,
88Campbell, FTC. Dkt. No. 9223 (Aug. 18, 1992).
891994 Policy Statement, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,388 at footnote 90.
90Ibid.
91Ibid.
21the Commission seeks to prevent deceptive claims rather than ensure consistent
ones. The EPS also establishes that omission of even valuable dietary infor-
mation might not rise to the level of deception under the FTC Act.92 The
Statement quite sensibly comments that in many forms of advertising it would
not be feasible to include all nutritional information that may be of interest
to consumers.93 It is quite clear that the Commission is satised to let FDA,
with its superior scientic resources, lead the way on consumer education about
healthier diets.
III. Words to the Wise { Public Comments by the FTC
While the EPS lays out a number of harmonizing principles, its many reser-
vations preserve a good deal of uncertainty in the regulatory scheme for food
health claims. Perhaps the document is best understood as an issue-spotter
for potentially aggressive advertisers, or maybe an admonition to stay o the
thin ice. Like case law, the Statement is often ambiguous or fact-specic, and
wary advertisers would do well to supplement its vague guidelines. The public
comments of FTC ocials, for instance, emphasize particular areas of concern.
In a recent speech before the National Infomercial Marketing Associ-
ation, for instance, FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek reiterated the tradi-
tional reasonable basis requirement for substantiation of advertiser representa-
tions. More specically, he sought to dispel Myth #1 { If a Couple of Studies
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
22Support Your Claim, It Is Substantiated.94 In doing so, he urged manufac-
turers to consider not only contradictory studies and design aws in successful
research, but also whether studies are conducted in a suciently independent
fashion. If the studies are conducted by persons who ha[ve] an incentive to
obtain particular results, [the food manufacturer's] claim may not be substan-
tiated.95 While this admonition appears nowhere in the EPS, it has proven
important in a recent high-prole regulatory action.96
In an earlier speech before the National Food Processors Association,
Mr. Starek emphasized the exibility implicit in the EPS. Advertisers have
a green light for claims approved by FDA and a series of clear red lights for
non-approved claims, Mr. Starek declared.97 He also declared that in areas
where there are dierences between advertising and labeling, or dierences be-
tween FTC's and FDA's statutory authority, advertisers faced yellow lights, and
should proceed with caution.98 Starek further identied synonyms, comparative
claims, and health claims as yellow light areas.
Another high level FTC ocial eshed out practical administrative
policy in a recent interview.99 Anne Maher, Assistant Director of Advertising
Practices at the FTC, reiterated the Commission's deference to FDA on scien-
tic matters. However, she also stated that for unapproved health claims, FTC
94Roscoe B. Starek III, Myths and Half-Truths about Deceptive Advertising, 11-14-96 WLN
12129 (text of prepared remarks by FTC Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek III).
95Ibid.
96See infra, Metagenics, Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9267 (initial decision).
97FTC's Ad/Label Policy Sends Clear Signals, Starek Says, 2 Food Labeling News No. 37
(June 16, 1994).
98Ibid.
99FTC Ocial Cites Close Cooperation with FDA in Monitoring Accuracy of Food Adver-
tising, 4 Food Labeling News No. 46 (August 15, 1996).
23might allow an advertiser to veer a little from the FDA regulations.100 She also
acknowledged that the FTC is increasingly concerned with the aggressive mar-
keting of comparative claims, especially the large number of reduced-calorie and
reduced-fat representations. Ms. Maher commented, I think it's important to
make sure that they're not conveying 'low' claims to consumers.101 Ms. Maher's
analysis implicitly recognizes that the FTC's looser standard for comparative
claims may have diluted FDA's educational eorts in this area. In singling out
regulation of comparative claims for comment, she may have intended to signal
the industry to rein in its horses a bit.
Finally, in a recent New York Times article Lee Peeler, associate direc-
tor for advertising practices in the commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection,
stated that nutrition advertising claims for both food products and supplement
products have been a high priority for us of late. The article also revealed that
the FTC has settled 23 food advertising cases since 1990. It settled only two in
the previous decade.102 Either the FTC has stiened its enforcement policy, or
advertisers have gone hog wild under the vague EPS regime.
IV. Recent Enforcement Actions
A. Harmonization { A Few Steps Forward
Recent enforcement actions also shed some light on the relationship
between the FTC and FDA health claims standards. In many cases, the agen-
100Ibid.
101Ibid.
102Marian Burros, Eating Well { Enforcing Truth in Nutrition Claims, The New York Times,
January 8, 1997.
24cies have been in accord. Just after the FTC promulgated its EPS, for instance,
it resolved the Stouer Foods case,103 in which the manufacturer had made a
low sodium claim that failed to conform to FDA's denition. Explicitly relying
on FDA's scientic judgment, the Commission found the advertisement per se
deceptive.
In a recent consent decree, the FTC required Unilever United States,
Inc., one of the nation's largest manufacturers of margarines and spreads, to
alter its advertising campaign for Promise margarine to conform with many
of FDA's labeling standards. The campaign used a Get Heart Smart slogan,
included heart-shaped pats of Promise on pancakes, and displayed statements
like Low in Saturated Fat and No Cholesterol.104 The FTC decided that the
campaign was a deceptive health claim, because Promise contained levels of
total fat high enough to be disqualied from making any health claim under
FDA's regulations. Furthermore, the FTC required the manufacturer to adhere
to FDA's requirements for the low fat designation, and also called for disclosure
of the total grams of fat in conjunction with any cholesterol claims.105 An FTC
ocial admitted that Promise margarine is probably healthier than butter, but
attacked the campaign as insuciently qualied. In this situation the Com-
mission seemed willing to forsake its traditional encouragement of comparative
claims in favor of a more harmonized, rigorous approach.
Three other FTC consent orders indicate a more harmonized standard.
103Stouer Foods Corporation (1994), FTC Dkt. No. D-9250 (September 26).
104Promise Margarine's Get Heart Smart Campaign Targeted in FTC Deceptive Advertising
Case, FDCH Federal Department and Agency Documents, FTC, November 7, 1996.
105Ibid.
25In the Mrs. Fields case, the FTC ordered the manufacturer to reclassify its low
fat cookies because they failed to conform to FDA's metric for the low fat de-
scriptor.106 In the Good News Eggs case, the FTC forbade the manufacturer
from making representations about the eect of its product on heart disease or
serum cholesterol levels. The consent order allowed the manufacturer to refor-
mulate its claims under FDA's standards.107 Finally, just a few days ago the
FTC signed a consent agreement with Uno's Pizzeria over its low fat thin crust
pizza claims.108 The order called for the manufacturer to adhere to FDA's low
fat guidelines, i.e., 3 grams of fat per serving. The pizzas at issue contained
anywhere from 14 to a whopping 36 grams of fat per serving.
One other recent enforcement action illustrates the rigor of the FTC's
current scientic substantiation requirement. The FTC attacked Metagenics,
Inc. for claiming that its calcium supplement (1) restores lost bone, (2) restores
bone strength, (3) reduces or eliminates pain associated with bone ailments, (4)
is more eective than other calcium supplements in treating bone ailments, (5) is
more bioavailable than other forms of calcium, (6) builds bone or increases bone
thickness, (7) halts or prevents bone loss or thinning, and (8) halts, prevents,
or treats osteoporosis.109 An FTC Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld
the FTC on the rst ve charges, yet found the nal three claims to be ade-
quately substantiated. Interestingly, the three accepted claims most closely con-
106FTC, Mrs. Fields Settle Complaint about Fat Content of Cookies, Food Labeling News
(March 7, 1996).
107Good News Products Settles FTC Charges Over Egg Claims, The Food Institute Report
(June 12, 1995).
108Marian Burros, Pizza Chain to Withdraw Its Low Fat Claims, The New York Times,
January 23, 1997, A21.
109FTC Law Judge Finds Calcium Supplement Ads Misleading, 4 Food Labeling News No.
5 (October 31, 1996).
26formed to FDA's regulations for calcium/osteoporosis representations.110 The
ALJ decried the source of substantiation{published, peer-reviewed studies by
Metagenics CEO Jerey Katke{as dubious.
B. Harmonization { A Few Steps Back
Despite the examples of harmonization, however, in many cases the FTC and
FDA still diverge. A year after the FTC issued the EPS, for example, the Center
for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) criticized the Commission for failing
to act against certain health claims in advertisements for whole milk.111 The
milk industry's television commercials had declared They say milk and simple
exercise can help prevent osteoporosis. While it is doubtful that this claim hewed
close enough to FDA's model message for osteoporosis, there is no question that
it violated the agency's prohibition against health claims for products high in
saturated fats and cholesterol.112 The National Food Processors Association
defended the advertisement as an appropriate use of limited space to impart
one important piece of health information.113
Around the same time, CSPI again attacked the FTC over its consent
agreement with Haagen-Dazs for its failure to fully integrate FDA fat disclosure
rules. While the consent order did call for Haagen-Dazs to comply with the 3
fat grams low fat metric in its frozen yogurt bars, it neglected to require the
11021 C.F.R. 101.72.
111John Donnelly, Consumer Group Blasts Health Claims in TV Milk Ads, Food & Drink
Daily (March 6, 1995).
11221 C.F.R. 101.14(a)(5).
113See supra, footnote 106.
27manufacturer to include a nutrition panel referral statement in direct proximity
to the claim, as required by FDA. CSPI also called for the FTC to implement
proactive guidelines a la FDA, rather than pursue its case-by-case retroactive
approach.114 Given the time and space constraints of various advertising media,
CSPI's complaints appear a bit blustery here.
V. The Attainable Ideal { A Happy Inconsistency
The gaps and inconsistencies between health claims regulation at the FTC
and FDA have spawned a great deal of debate. Which approach better serves
the public health? As is probably clear from the cases mentioned, CSPI is
outraged by the FTC's failure to adopt the NLEA and FDA's consequent regu-
lations. Calling the ESP a Recipe for Consumer Confusion, CSPI has attacked
FTC exibility on comparative nutrient content claims, disclosures, and health
claims for comparatively healthy substitutes (e.g., chicken for beef).115 As ev-
idence, a high level CSPI ocial has cited a survey indicating that 76% of
consumers believe too many foods already claim to be healthy.116 CSPI evi-
dently believes that lower substantiation standards dilute the authority of more
valid claims.
Other commentators have declared the EPS a loophole bigger than
the Washington beltway.117 In Congress, Representatives Al Swift (D-Wash.)
114CSPI Hits FTC's Proposed Consent Order with Haagen-Dazs, 3 Food Labeling News 21
(February 23, 1995).
115CSPI Asks Congress to Look at Loopholes in FTC Harmonization Policy, 2 Food Labeling
News No. 36 (June 9, 1994).
116Food Marketing Institute, Shopping for Health (1995), Washington, D.C.
117Angela Shah, FTC to Require Food Ads to Follow FDA Label Guides, Wall Street Journal
28and John Moakley (D-Mass.) have applauded the EPS as a good faith eort
to achieve harmonization, but have also pledged to pursue further legislation
should the FTC fall short of meeting the goals of the NLEA.118 These Con-
gressmen have been working closely with CSPI.
Despite the shrill cries of protest, there are solid reasons for the FTC
to maintain its more exible regulatory standards. First, there is some evidence
that the relaxed health claims standards of the 1980's contributed to signicant
reductions in average fat consumption during that period. From 1977-1990,
men's fat consumption fell from 112.8 grams per day to 92.6 grams per day, and
women's consumption fell from 73.3 grams per day to 62.1 grams per day.119
Researchers also found that consumers make better choices when companies
can compete on nutritional characteristics. The results of this study illustrate
the value of the market as an information-forcing mechanism and refute CSPI's
concerns about oversimplication of health claims and deception of consumers.
Aording manufacturers an outlet for comparative health claims is
another good reason for maintaining inconsistent regulatory approaches at the
FTC and FDA. While one might not wish to sully the integrity of the food
label with less substantial claims, surely print or television media are an ap-
propriate place for a nutrition war. Just as incremental price slashing often
yields a hefty cumulative discount over a very short time, so might marginal
fat reductions soon create the guiltless hot fudge sundae. Under the strict FDA
(May 16, 1994), A6.
118Reps. Support FTC Ad/Label Policy, Promise to Monitor it Closely, 2 Food Labeling
News No. 13 (October 13, 1996).
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29approach, manufacturers have no incentive to implement marginal changes. For
some products, immediate wholesale changes may be impossible, or at least in-
conceivable. Why penalize the sure-footed tortoise in favor of the unreliable
hare?
The FTC's looser standard for armative disclosures is another area where
inconsistency makes sense. By requiring disclosure only when an advertisement
would otherwise be deceptive, the FTC sets up a exible scheme that promotes
creative packaging of health messages while reserving broad authority to act.
The FTC's style of oversight recognizes that the simplest messages are the most
eective. Disclaimers and other clutter confuse more than inform, and television
and radio media are particularly unsuited to accommodate a broad range of
disclosures. Provided they adhere to a truthful and nonmisleading standard,
uncluttered advertisements best accomplish the NLEA's educational mission.
Some might feel that the FTC's exibility on FDA model language and re-
stricted synonyms sets up a framework for mixed messages to consumers. Many
worry that advertisers will take the proverbial mile and disseminate wild and
disparate claims, with the net result that consumers will elevate marketing form
over nutritional substance. However, one must remember that the FTC always
reserves authority to prohibit deceptive claims. In addition, by allowing the
marketers to develop eective messages on their own, the FTC unleashes the
awesome creative power of the market. There is little doubt that food indus-
30try slogans will disseminate health information more eectively than a bland
bureaucratic pronouncement. For instance, the National Food Processors As-
sociation (NFPA) has criticized FDA's model health claim on vegetables and
cancer for being written at a grade 13.8 reading level. The NFPA advocates
attention-getting bursts or slogans, such as heart healthy, be cancer smart, or
helps reduce risk of brittle bones.120 Obviously, there is a ne line between
appropriate education and inappropriate persuasion, but one must rely on the
FTC to police the border scrupulously.
Finally, the FTC's encouragement of relatively healthy food substitu-
tions is a welcome loosening of FDA's good food/bad food paradigm. FDA's
jelly bean rule prevents consumers from receiving valuable dietary information
and inhibits responsible decision making. Not everyone will substitute an apple
for a brownie, but many may choose to switch to a non-nutritive compromise
like jelly beans. Likewise, many consumers benet from receiving comparative
health messages for products like pork and chicken. America will not become
a nation of vegetarians overnight, but we devour fewer burgers if responsible
comparative claims continue to be allowed.
VI. Conclusion
The rhetoric of the FTC Enforcement Policy Statement is conciliatory, com-
promising, and deferential to FDA and its NLEA mandate. Beneath the sooth-
120Health Claims Rule 'Excessively Restrictive', May Violate Freedom of Speech, Food Man-
ufacturers Say, 4 Food Labeling News No. 43 (July 25, 1996).
31ing words, however, lie some nagging controversies. Diering statutory man-
dates and jurisdictional authorities have led to conicting regulatory philoso-
phies in a few areas. Each agencies' special pride in its turf may also contribute
to the failure to completely harmonize the regulatory approach to food health
claims. Instead of asking Which policy better protects public health?, perhaps
we should ask Which policy better protects public health without sacricing
other important values? These might include First Amendment values, free
market values, administrative discretion values, and a whole host of others.
Undoubtedly, these values are susceptible to one dening interpretation and
regulatory implementation. Just as one can eventually force a square peg into
a round hole. The agencies have operated under an uneasy truce since 1954, ar-
guably converging despite dierent agendas. Why not stay the course of exible
harmonization? Why not render unto each agency its own?
32